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ABSTRACT
One of the primary ways in which India engages in online censor-
ship is by ordering Internet Service Providers (ISPs) operating in its
jurisdiction to block access to certain websites for its users. This pa-
per reports the different techniques Indian ISPs are using to censor
websites, and investigates whether website blocklists are consistent
across ISPs. We propose a suite of tests that prove more robust than
previous work in detecting DNS and HTTP based censorship. Our
tests also discern the use of SNI inspection for blocking websites,
which is previously undocumented in the Indian context. Using
information from court orders, user reports and government orders,
we compile the largest known list of potentially blocked websites in
India. We pass this list to our tests and run them from connections
of six different ISPs, which together serve more than 98% of Internet
users in India. Our findings not only confirm that ISPs are using
different techniques to block websites, but also demonstrate that
different ISPs are not blocking the same websites.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nation states around the world engage in web censorship using
a variety of legal and technical methods [10, 34, 44, 47]. India is
no different in this regard: the Government of India can legally
order internet service providers (ISPs) operating in its jurisdiction
to block access to certain websites for its users. This makes the
situation different from jurisdictions like Iran and China, where
internet censorship is largely centralised [10, 46].
Legal provisions in India, namely Section 69A and Section 79 of
the Information Technology (IT) Act, allow the Central Government
and the various courts in the country to issue website-blocking
orders that ISPs are legally bound to comply with [1, 2]. The imple-
mentation of these provisions create various uncertainties in how
internet users experience web censorship.
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First, the regulations do not mandate ISPs to use specific filter-
ing mechanisms. Thus, ISPs are are at liberty to employ various
technical methods [47].
Second, website-blocking orders, especially those issued by the
Government, are rarely available in the public domain. ISPs are, in
fact, mandated by regulations to maintain confidentiality of cer-
tain website-blocking orders issued by the Government [3].Various
attempts by researchers and advocacy organisations to obtain the
complete list of blocked websites have failed [4, 24].
Third, the whimsy of ISPs and the Government aggravates these
problems. Despite strict net neutrality regulations in India that
prohibit ISPs from arbitrarily restricting access to websites [35],
some ISPs may be doing so nonetheless [21]. Reports also suggest
that the Government has issued blocking orders and then rescinded
them on the same day [40].
These concerns motivated us to study web censorship in India
in detail. In particular, we seek to answer two questions pertaining
to how internet users in India experience web censorship: (i) what
are the technical methods of censorship used by ISPs in India? (ii)
are all ISPs blocking the same websites?
We contribute to research in documenting web censorship in
India in three distinct ways:
Coverage of censorshipmechanisms. Previouswork has doc-
umented the use of DNS and HTTP based censorship techniques
by Indian ISPs [47]. We include tests to determine whether ISPs are
blocking websites based on the Server Name Indication, a Transport
Layer Security extension. We find that Jio (an ISP serving 49.7% of
internet users in India [36]) employs this technique. Additionally,
we identify certain ISPs employing multiple censorship schemes, a
fact previously undocumented in India.
Inconsistencies in websites being blocked. Although previ-
ous work records some inconsistencies in website blocklists across
ISPs [47], they use a relatively smaller corpus of potentially blocked
websites (1200). We curate the largest-known list of potentially
blocked websites in India 1 (4379), which has allowed us to draw
extensive conclusions about how experiences of web censorship
vary across ISPs. We also report cases of an ISP blocking websites
that are not blocked by any other ISPs.
Accuracy of censorship detection techniques. Yadav et al.
[47] point out some drawbacks of relying on OONI [19] for mea-
suring internet censorship in India, and propose new methods
of detecting DNS and HTTP based censorship. However, we find
that their methodology to detect DNS censorship makes unstated
assumptions which we highlight and work around in our paper. Ad-
ditionally, their HTTP censorship detection technique relies heavily
on manual inspection, making a study at our scale untenable. We
propose a novel HTTP censorship detection algorithm that requires
no manual inspection, and is more accurate (in terms of F1 score)
than previous automated methods.
1 This list can be accessed at https://bit.ly/blockedwebsitelist
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2 RELATEDWORK
There have been a fair number of previous studies which explore
censorship mechanisms in different countries such as China [13,
31, 37, 46], Pakistan [7, 29, 34], Syria [12], Italy [7], Iran [10], and
Korea [7]. Additionally, web censorship monitoring tools such as
CensMon [42], and OONI [19] have allowed a similar analysis on a
global scale. Such works highlight that countries across the world
adopt a melange of techniques to censor the web.
Amongst the most prevalent is DNS based blocking, where the
network responds to DNS queries for websites it wishes to block
with either (i) DNS errors [30, 34, 38] or (ii) incorrect IP addresses
[9, 10, 32, 44, 47]. Another popular technique employed by networks
to filter websites is examiningHTTP traffic and looking for (i) HTTP
headers for blacklisted hostnames, or (ii) the HTTP request and/or
response bodies for certain keywords [10, 15, 29, 34, 37, 42, 46].
Upon detecting such requests, censors have been found to either
explicitly serve censorship notices [10, 34], close established HTTP
connections [37], or both [47]. Some instances of filtering traffic by
inspecting TCP/IP packets for destination blacklisted IP addresses
have also been reported in Syria [12], Italy [7], and China [13].
There is also recent evidence that China is inspecting and filtering
HTTPS web traffic based on the Server Name Indication present in
the TLS handshake [13], but previous work has reported that no
Indian ISP uses this technique [47].
In the Indian context, there has been an initial attempt to under-
stand the censorship mechanisms employed by Indian ISPs [23, 47].
However, as we find, these studies have not uncovered the full
extent of web censorship in India in terms of both technical mecha-
nisms and scale.
3 DATA CURATION
We compile a list of of potentially blocked websites from three
types of sources:
Government orders. A website/URL blocking order may come
from the Government of India [1, 2]. These orders are usually not
in the public domain. For orders issued under section 69A of the IT
Act, a confidentiality clause prevents any party from disclosing its
contents [3]. We collect published and leaked Government orders
that are available publicly, which contribute 890 URLs to our corpus.
Court orders. The various courts in India also have the power
to issue website blocking orders[2]. Not all such orders are available
in the public domain [27]. However, the Government and BSNL (a
public company operating as an ISP) have provided portions of this
list when under pressure to respond to Right to Information (RTI)
requests. [4, 20]. Court orders contribute 9367 URLs to our list.
User reports. The Internet Freedom Foundation collects and
publishes reports from internet users who notice blocked websites2.
These contribute an additional 62 URLs to our list.
Collecting data from these sources led to a total of 9673 unique
URLs. Given that most of these URLs are sourced from recent court
orders, there is a high possibility of them being currently blocked.
The scope of our analysis is restricted to website-level (rather than
webpage-level) blocking, and so we extract unique domain names
from this list, resulting in 5798 websites. To limit ourselves to active
websites, we exclude all websites for which we could not resolve via
2 https://bit.ly/iffuserreport
Tor circuits. We end up with a total of 4379 websites, which to the
best of our knowledge, is the largest known corpus of potentially
blocked websites in India.
4 METHODOLOGY
We probe for the presence of different censorship techniques in six
major Indian ISPs. These include Reliance Jio Infocomm (Jio), Bharti
Airtel (Airtel), Vodafone Idea (Vodafone), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.
(BSNL), Atria Convergence Technologies (ACT), and Mahanagar
Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL). The Telecom Regulatory Authority
of India reveals that as of October 2019, these six ISPs together
serve 657.46 million internet subscribers in India, i.e. 98.82% of the
subscriber base in India [36].
4.1 DNS censorship
Domain Name System (DNS) resolution involves translating a host-
name to its corresponding IP address(es), and is usually the first
step in accessing a website. Traditional DNS resolution is prone to
poisoning and injection attacks [11]. There are secure resolution
protocols such as DNSSEC [41], DNS over HTTPS (DoH) [25], and
DNS over TLS (DoT) [26] that mitigate these attacks; however, they
are not widely deployed [14, 16].
DNS Poisoning. By default, DNS queries are sent to a resolver
configured by the ISP. Thus, ISPs can return an incorrect IP address
or nothing at all in response to clients’ DNS queries for websites
they wish to block [10, 44, 48].
DNS Injection. ISPs can intercept DNS queries for websites they
wish to block and inject incorrect IP addresses in the responses
[9, 32, 38].
We term an ISP’s use of DNS poisoning or DNS injection attacks
to block websites as DNS censorship.
4.1.1 Existing techniques. Detecting DNS censorship has pre-
viously been done by comparing responses from the test resolver
with responses from trusted resolvers [19, 22]. However, this can
lead to an over-reporting in censorship as these trusted resolvers
can respond with a different IP address for legitimate reasons (such
as load balancing) [8]. Lowe et al. circumvent this problem by se-
lecting 5 censorship-free control resolvers and only investigating
domain names for which all resolvers returned the same IP address;
however, this results in a decrease in the size of the test list [31].
Another technique is to rely on the autonomous system (AS)
number3 to which the returned IP address belongs. Kuhrer et al.
[30] consider a DNS response legitimate if the IP addresses returned
via the trusted and tested resolvers belong to the same AS. This
approach fails to take into account that a domain name can resolve
to IP addresses belonging to different ASes. Yadav et al. deem a
DNS response censored if the returned IP address belongs to the
same AS as the client’s IP address [47]. This approach rides on
two unsubstantiated assumptions: (i) that the incorrect IP address
returned by the ISP always belongs to the same AS as the client’s,
and (ii) the given website is not hosted within the same AS. Our
proposed technique works around all these flaws.
4.1.2 Proposed technique. We begin by creating a set of IP ad-
dresses IPd,C for each domain name d in our list by combining the
3 https://www.apnic.net/get-ip/faqs/asn/
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responses obtained by resolving it via 5 censorship-free control
networks (collectively termed C): (i) Tor circuits with exit nodes in
US, CA and AU; and (ii) DoH servers run by Cloudflare and Google.
In a test network, we attempt to resolve each domain name in our
list using the ISP-assigned resolver. If the resulting IP address is
present in IPd,C , we conclude that the ISP is not using DNS censor-
ship to block that website. Otherwise, similar to [30, 47], we flag
the domain name censored if (i) the resolver responds with an error
(for eg. NXDOMAIN), or (ii) the resolver responds with a bogon IP4.
We further investigate the list of domain namesD ′, for which the
ISP-configured resolver returns an IP address not found in IPd,C .
For these domain names, the test network is returning either (i)
a legitimate IP address not captured via the control networks, or
(ii) an incorrect IP address. We term the second possibility as DNS
tampering. As [10, 47] report, ISPs implementing DNS tampering
respond with the same incorrect IP address to DNS queries for
websites it wishes to block. We try to identify such behaviour by an
ISP by looking at all IP addresses being returned by it for domain
names in D ′.
For each network n, we construct IPn , the list of IP addresses
received by resolving domain names in D ′ via that network. Next
we calculateMRFn , the relative frequency of the most frequent IP
address in IPn . By comparingMRF values of the test and control
networks, we are able to discern if the test network responds with
an abnormally recurring IP address. This would be characteristic
of an ISP that is censoring websites by returning an incorrect IP ad-
dress, i.e. employing DNS tampering5. In ISPs where we detect DNS
tampering, we mark domain names for which the DNS response
was the most frequent IP address as censored.
4.2 TCP/IP Blocking
ISPs can block access to websites by preventing clients from con-
necting to the specific IP addresses the website is hosted on [7, 12,
13, 42]. Additionally, the ISP may inspect TCP packet headers for
the destination port number if it wishes to block certain types of
traffic for that IP address. However, this censorship technique can
result in over-blocking due to the popularity of virtual hosting,
which allows multiple websites to be hosted on the same IP address
[17]. These pitfalls are a plausible explanation for why ISPs in Ko-
rea [7], Iran [10] and Pakistan [7, 34] do not use this technique.
Yadav et al also conclude the same for Indian ISPs[47]; however, it
is unclear how they determine what IP addresses to probe to detect
such censorship.
4.2.1 Proposed technique. Wefirst obtain legitimate IP addresses
for websites in our test list as discussed in section 4.1.2. This pre-
cludes any DNS censorship by ISPs from interfering with our test.
Building on [42, 47], we perform a two-step test. First, we ping6
the IP address to verify whether it is reachable through the test net-
work. A response implies that the ISP is not filtering traffic based on
the destination IP address. For such IP addresses, we then attempt
to establish a TCP connection on ports 80 (used for HTTP traffic)
4https://ipinfo.io/bogon
5 We leverage the fact that most websites in our curated list have a high possibility of
being blocked. See section 3
6 https://linux.die.net/man/8/ping
Algorithm 1: DNS Tampering Detection
Input: Test Network T , Control Networks C , Domain Names D
Result: Determines DNS tampering
1 C ← {C1, C2, ..., Ck } // control networks (Tor, DoH)
2 for d ∈ D do
3 for c ∈ C do
4 I Pd,c ← DNS response for d collected via c
5 I Pd,C ← {I Pd,c |c ∈ C }
6 I Pd,t ← DNS response for d collected via test network
7 D′ ← {d |d ∈ D ∧ I Pd,t < I Pd,C } // domain names for which
test response did not match any of control responses
8 for c ∈ C do
9 for d ∈ D′ do
10 I Pd,c ← DNS response for d collected via c
11 I Pc ← {I Pd,c |d ∈ D′ }
12 for ip ∈ I Pc do
13 RFip,c ← Relative frequency of ip in I Pc
14 MRFc ←max ({RFip,c |ip ∈ I Pc })
15 µMRFC ← mean of MRFc ∀ c ∈ C
16 σMRFC ← standard deviation of MRFc ∀ c ∈ C
17 for d ∈ D′ do
18 I Pd,t ← DNS response for d in test network
19 I Pt ← {I Pd,t |d ∈ D′ }
20 for ip ∈ I Pt do
21 RFip,t ← Relative frequency of ip in I Pt
22 MRFt ←max ({RFip,t |ip ∈ I Pt })
23 if MRFt − µMRFC > 3 ∗ σMRFC then
24 return DNS Tampering present
25 else
26 return DNS Tampering not present
and 443 (used for HTTPS traffic). A successful TCP 3-way hand-
shake with a given IP address and port would imply the absence
of TCP-based blocking. A failure in either step, however, can be
attributed to network congestion, host unavailability or, of course,
censorship by the ISP. To establish that connection failures are in-
deed due to censorship, we run the same tests via Tor circuits with
exit nodes in censorship-free countries (USA, CA and AU). We rule
out host unavailability and network congestion by reattempting
failed connections five times with a delay of 100 seconds.
4.3 HTTP Filtering
Unencrypted HTTP traffic between a client and host can be in-
tercepted and monitored. Previous studies have discovered dif-
ferent techniques adopted by censors for blocking HTTP access
[10, 29, 34, 37, 42]. When a client attempts to access a website that
the ISP seeks to block, the ISP sends back forged TCP or HTTP
packets that seem to be originating from the host. These can in-
clude (i) a TCP packet with the RST (reset) bit set, forcing the client
to kill the connection instantly [37], (ii) an HTTP 2xx response7
containing a censorship notice [34], (iii) an HTTP 3xx response7
redirecting the client to a URL serving a censorship notice [34], or
7 HTTP response codes (RFC 7231) – https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-6.1
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(iv) an HTTP 4xx/5xx response7 conveying an HTTP error to the
client [10].
4.3.1 Existing techniques. Due to the size of our corpus, we can-
not rely on manual inspection as done by [47]. Existing automated
techniques for detecting censored HTTP responses usually rely on
making comparisons with uncensored responses, collected either
via control servers set up in censorship-free countries [7, 42], or via
Tor circuits [18, 19, 45, 47]. Due to the dynamic nature of content
hosted on websites, comparing verbatim responses can be erro-
neous [28]. Moreover, the geographical location of a client can also
introduce variations (such as the content language) in the received
response. To mitigate these issues, prior research utilizes meta in-
formation derived from responses for comparison [19, 28, 45].
Jones et al. propose methods for identifying HTML pages which
contain a censorship notice [28]. They report that comparing a
test response’s length and HTML DOM structure with that of an
uncensored response can help identify such pages with a high ac-
curacy. Similarly, other authors use response length in conjunction
with different HTML similarity metrics for comparisons [7, 18, 19].
However, these approaches perform well only in instances where
censors explicitly inject censorship notices, an assumption that
generally doesn’t hold true: as discussed above, censors have been
known to adopt tacit approaches such as responding with HTTP
errors or redirections. In the absence of HTML responses, these
methods depend solely on response lengths, which as [47] discover,
can be inefficacious [47]. The OONI tool [19] does a more elaborate
comparison, drawing conclusions by observing differences in sta-
tus codes, headers, lengths, and HTML titles. However, even their
approach culminates in false positives and false negatives [47].
Building upon these approaches, we propose a more robust au-
tomated technique for detecting censored responses (outlined in
algorithm 2) and use it to probe Indian ISPs for HTTP censorship.
4.3.2 Collecting HTTP responses. We begin by resolving the
IP address of each domain name in our list via trusted resolvers, as
discussed in section 4.1.2. Since DNS resolution may return multiple
IP addresses for the same domain name, we probe all resulting
(domain name, IP address) pairs in our experiment.
For each (domain name, IP address) pair, we make HTTP
GET requests to the IP address, with the HOST header set as the
domain name. This is done via 5 control servers in censorship-
free countries (US, CA, GB, NE and AU), and via the test network.
Unlike some studies [18, 19, 45, 47] we avoid using Tor circuits for
collecting control responses, since some websites blacklist them
and respond differently to HTTP requests originating from them.
Additionally, instead of using just one control response [19, 28, 47],
we consider multiple responses.
4.3.3 Proposed technique. After collecting the control and test
responses, we follow the detection technique outlined in algorithm
2. First, we compare the HTTP status code of control responses
with that of the test response. If these status codes do not match,
we classify the test response as censored. However, the opposite
need not necessarily imply the absence of censorship. In case the
status codes are the same, we investigate further on a case by case
basis as explained below.
• 2xx (Success):We check for response length inconsistency
and response body inconsistency.
• 3xx (Redirection):We compare the domain name present
in the redirect URLs.
• 4xx/5xx (Error):We compare the session header keys.
Algorithm 2: HTTP Censorship Detection
Input: DOMAIN NAME dn, IP ADDRESS ip
Result: Determines HTTP censorship
1 control_res← HTTP GET response for dn,ip in control networks;
2 test_res← HTTP GET response for dn,ip in test network;
3 if connection reset while getting test_res then
4 return censored;
5 if control_res.status_code , test_res.status_code then
6 return censored;
7 else if test_res.status_code = 2xx then
8 if test_res.length inconsistent OR test_res.body inconsistent then
9 return censored;
10 else
11 return uncensored;
12 else if test_res.status_code = 3xx then
13 if mismatch in control_res, test_res redirect HOSTNAMEs then
14 return censored;
15 else
16 return uncensored;
17 else if mismatch in control_res, test_res header keys then
18 return censored;
19 else
20 return uncensored;
The response length inconsistency and response body inconsis-
tency used above is defined as follows
Response length inconsistency.Given control response lengths
(Lci ,Lcii , ...Lcn ) and a test response length Lt , we call Lt incon-
sistent if |µLc − Lt | > 3 ∗ σLc . Here µLc is the mean, and σLc the
standard deviation of the control response lengths.
Response body inconsistency. For each control and test re-
sponse, we generate term frequency (TF ) vectors using HTML tags
extracted from the response body. A test response body is called
inconsistent if |µc,c −µt,c | > 3∗σc,c , where µc,c is the mean cosine
similarity between TF vectors of control responses, µt,c the mean
cosine similarity between TF vectors of test and control responses,
and σc,c the standard deviation of cosine similarity between TF
vectors of control responses.
To verify the efficacy of our proposed technique, we manually
inspect 500 responses from the six ISPs (a total of 3000 responses),
and categorise them as censored or uncensored. We implement the
previous techniques and compare their predictions on the annotated
set to ours. As reported in table 1, our proposed technique detects
both censored and uncensored responses with a higher f1-score
than previous approaches.
4.4 SNI Based Censorship
The Server Name Indication (SNI) was designed as an extension to
TLS to support the hosting of multiple HTTPS websites on the same
How India Censors the Web WebSci ’20, July 6–10, 2020, Southampton, United Kingdom
Detection Technique Precision Recall F1 scoreC U C U C U
Length difference [28, 47] 0.65 0.73 0.77 0.59 0.70 0.66
HTML similarity [28] 0.45 0.44 0.62 0.28 0.52 0.34
OONI [19] 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.80 0.70
Proposed 0.71 0.98 0.99 0.63 0.83 0.77
Table 1: Performance of various HTTP censorship detection
techniques. We report Precission, Recall and F1-score for
Censored (C) andUncensored (U) classes. Our proposed tech-
nique has a higher F1-score than the previous techniques.
IP address [6]. The SNI is an attribute included in the ClientHello
message, where the client specifies the hostname it wishes to con-
nect to. Since the SNI is in clear-text, censors can monitor this
field for hostnames and block websites by preventing successful
TLS connections [13, 33, 43, 49]. While such censorship has been
documented in China [13] and South Korea [5], there has been no
prior evidence to suggest that Indian ISPs are using this technique
[47].
4.4.1 Proposed technique. For this test, we take advantage of
a server configured to accept TLS connections even if it does not
host the website specified in the SNI. For each potentially blocked
website, we attempt to establish a TLS version 1.3 connection with
that server’s IP address using the website’s hostname as the SNI. A
successful connection would imply the absence of SNI-inspection
based censorship in the test network. Using TLS version 1.3 ensures
that only the IP address and servername are present in clear-text,
since all subsequent communication after the ClientHello and
ServerHello is encrypted [39]. This precludes the interference of
any other censorship technique used by the ISP with our test.
5 RESULTS
We first report the different censorship techniques adopted by ISPs,
and then compare the consistency of website blocklists across ISPs.
5.1 Censorship techniques
We notice stark differences in censorship mechanisms adopted by
Indian ISPs, each using a range of techniques individually or in
combination to censor websites (outlined in Table 2).
ISP DNS TCP/IP HTTP SNI
ACT ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
Airtel ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
BSNL ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Jio ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
MTNL ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Vodafone ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Table 2: Censorship techniques employed by Indian ISPs
Interestingly, we notice different trends as compared to the pre-
vious study on Internet censorship in India [47]: (i) They report
Airtel to be using only HTTP header inspection based censorship
for blocking websites. We notice otherwise, with Airtel using DNS
censorship in conjunction with the aforementioned technique. (ii)
They report no instances of SNI-inspection based censorship in any
ISP, whereas we observe Jio to be using it extensively for block-
ing (2951 websites). These new observations indicate an evolving
nature of censorship mechanisms employed by Indian ISPs. Fur-
ther, we notice that all ISPs using multiple censorship mechanisms
are not blocking the same websites with each mechanism. For in-
stance, ACT uses only DNS censorship for blocking 233 websites,
only HTTP censorship for 1873 websites, and both to block 1615
websites. Such irregularities are illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1: Censorship techniques used by (i) ACT, (ii) Airtel,
and (iii) Jio for blocking websites. We notice the same ISP
using multiple techniques for blocking different websites.
5.1.1 DNS. We observed DNS censorship in four ISPs: ACT, Airtel,
BSNL, and MTNL. Airtel is unique in responding with NXDOMAIN
errors to DNS queries for websites it blocks. In the other three
ISPs (ACT, BSNL, and MTNL), we found that a distinct IP address
appeared unusually frequently in DNS responses when we tried
to resolve potentially blocked websites using the ISP-assigned re-
solver. This was in line with our intuition as detailed in section
4.1.2. By comparing the relative frequency of the most frequently
occurring IP address in responses collected from the test to those
collected from the control networks, we were able to detect which
ISPs were using DNS tampering. For illustration, Figure 2 com-
pares the frequency of IP addresses received for DNS queries for
potentially-blocked websites in four networks: an ISP that uses
DNS-based censorship (ACT), and three Tor circuits with exit nodes
in censorship-free countries. Each of these three ISPs responded
with a unique incorrect IP address. Using this fact, we conclude
that there was no collateral censorship from DNS-based blocking
by other ISPs.
5.1.2 TCP/IP. Given the immense collateral censorship caused by
TCP/IP based methods of censorship, we were not surprised to find
that, in line with [47], no ISP we investigated uses this technique.
5.1.3 HTTP. We observe HTTP-header based censorship in all the
six ISPs we investigated, but find only ACT, Airtel, Jio, and Vodafone
to be serving distinct censorship notices. Additionally, we notice
Airtel to be closing connections and not serving any censorship
notice for the majority of the websites it blocks. Using the unique
signatures of these responses, we are able to identify collateral
censorship in other ISPs stemming from these ISPs. For instance,
we find that all instances of HTTP censorship we detect in BSNL and
MTNL are attributable to Airtel and ACT. There was also a small
WebSci ’20, July 6–10, 2020, Southampton, United Kingdom Kushagra Singh, Gurshabad Grover, and Varun Bansal
number of instances where we observed Vodafone’s censorship
notices from tests run through Jio (2), and Airtel’s notices in tests
run through Vodafone (2).
5.1.4 SNI Inspection. We observe SNI inspection based censor-
ship only in one ISP, Jio. Since we did not observe SNI-based cen-
sorship in any another ISP, we rule out collateral censorship caused
by Jio’s employment of this technique. Out of 3340 websites we
found Jio to be censoring, we notice the use of SNI inspection for
2951 websites.
5.2 Website blocklists
If we observe a particular ISP blocking a website by any method,
we mark it as censored by that ISP. We term this list of censored
websites by a particular ISP as its website blocklist. Note that for
an ISP’s blocklist, we only consider websites are censored by the
ISP using its own mechanisms, i.e. we ignore collateral censorship
which we highlighted in section 5.1).
From our list of 4379 potentially blocked websites that we tested,
we find that 4033 appear in at least one ISP’s blocklist. We use this
list of 4033 websites for further analysis to see whether website
blocklists are consistent across ISPs.
Interestingly, we notice large inconsistencies in ISPs’ blocklists.
For instance, we find that in terms of absolute numbers, ACT blocks
the maximum number of websites (3721). Compared to ACT, Airtel
blocks roughly half the number of websites (1892). Table 2 notes
the size of each ISP’s blocklist. Perhaps most surprisingly, we find
that only 1115 websites out of the 4033 (just 27.64%) are blocked
by all six ISPs. Figure 3 illustrates the variation in different ISPs’
blocklists.
We also found that several websites (215) are being blocked
by only a single ISP out of the six. For instance, ACT blocks 62
Figure 2: Log frequency plot of IP addresses received by re-
solving websites in our test list. We notice an abnormally
large spike in subplot (i) (corresponding to ACT), compared
to subplots (ii), (iii), and (iv) (corresponding to Tor circuits)
websites that are not blocked by another ISP. This calls into question
whether blocking of these websites has any standing legal basis,
and is potential evidence of the fact that ISPs are blocking websites
arbitrarily.
ACT Airtel BSNL Jio MTNL Vodafone
3721 1892 3033 3340 3182 2273
Table 3: Number of websites (out of 4033) blocked by ISPs
Figure 3: Heatmap illustrating the overlap of blocklists of
different ISPs. For each pair of ISP blocklists La and Lb , we
calculate the Jaccard similarity coefficient, i.e. |La∩Lb ||La∪Lb | .
6 CONCLUSION
Our work presents the largest study of web censorship in India,
both in terms of number of censorship mechanisms that we test for,
and the corpus size of the potentially-blocked websites. In terms of
censorship methods, our results confirm that ISPs in India are at
liberty to use any technical filtering mechanism they wish: there
was, in fact, no single mechanism common across ISPs. We also
found a deep packet inspection technique, namely SNI inspection,
already being employed by the largest ISP in India (Jio) to censor
websites. Our work also records large inconsistencies in website
blocklists across ISPs in India.
Simply stated, we find conclusive proof that Internet users in
India can have wildly different experiences of web censorship.
Analysing inconsistencies in blocklists also makes it clear that
ISPs in India are (i) not properly complying with website blocking
(or subsequent unblocking orders), and/or (ii) arbitrarily blocking
websites without the backing of a legal order. This has important
legal ramifications: India’s net neutrality regulations, codified in
the license agreements that ISPs enter with the Government of
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India[35], explicitly prohibit such behaviour. Thus, our work pro-
vides empirical evidence of the fact that Indian ISPsmay be violating
net neutrality regulations.
Our work also points to how the choice of technical methods
used by ISPs to censor websites can decrease transparency about
state-ordered censorship in India. While some ISPs were serving
censorship notices, other ISPs made no such effort. For instance,
Airtel responded to DNS queries for websites it wishes to block with
NXDOMAIN. Jio used SNI-inspection to block websites, a choice
which makes it technically impossible for them to serve censorship
notices. Thus, the selection of certain technical methods by ISPs
exacerbate the concerns created by the opaque legal process that
allows the Government to censor websites.
Web censorship is a restriction on the right to freedom of expres-
sion and the right to access information, which are guaranteed to
all citizens by the Constitution of India. There is an urgent need to
reevaluate the legal and technical mechanisms of web censorship
in India to make sure the curtailment is transparent, and the actors
accountable.
7 FUTUREWORK
Recent user reports have suggested that website blocklists may
vary within the same ISP based on geographical location. Addi-
tionally, this variance in blocklists may also occur within mobile
and broadband networks belonging to the same ISP. Future work
may involve running our tests from different vantage points in the
country to determine the extent of such vagaries.
Contrasting results from previous studies also seem to suggest
an evolving nature of the internet censorship mechanism in In-
dia. Such an evolving mechanism adopted by the ISPs demands
that censorship-evasion techniques also adapt in tandem. Future
research can focus on developing tools that help Indian netizens
evade website blocking.
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